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Constitutional Scholarship in Canada
Abstract
This article identifies and evaluates the kinds of constitutional scholarship currently produced in Canada and
suggests some directions in which future research might profitably be directed Part I sets out the framework
within which the state of Canadian constitutional scholarship will be assessed, considers some of the factors
that have shaped that scholarship, and provides a brief overview of the various kinds of work being produced
in Canada. Part II outlines some of the areas where more and different work needs to be done, concluding
with some general thoughts on how the development of such directions in scholarship might be facilitated.




This article identifies and evaluates the kinds of constitutional scholarship currently
produced in Canada and suggests some directions in which future research might
profitably be directed Part I sets out the framework wiihin which the state of Canadian
constitutional scholarship will be assessed, considers some of the factors that have
shaped that scholarship, and provides a brief overview of the various kinds of work
being produced in Canada. Part II outlines some of the areas where more and different
work needs to be done, concluding with some general thoughts on how the development
of such directions in scholarship might be facilitated.
I. THE STATE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARSHIP TODAY
What analytical framework should be used to understand the state
of constitutional scholarship in Canada, and what criteria should be
applied in evaluating that work? In terms of a framework, I rely on
Law and Learning, for both the typology of research that it develops
and for its analysis of some of the formative influences on the nature
of that research. To evaluate the state of constitutional scholarship, I
will apply a test of utility: work will be considered worthwhile if it is
useful for the various audiences to which it is directed.
A. A Framework of Analysis
Law and Learning sets out four categories of legal research by which
the state of Canadian legal scholarship can be mapped: conventional,
theoretical, law reform, and fundamental.2 These categories form points
on a continuum, the boundaries of which are defined by the perspective
from which the research is undertaken. At one extreme, defined by
O Copyright, 1985, Marc Gold.
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School.
Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Law and Learning (1983).
2 Law and Learning, ibid at 65-66. Conventional research is defined as "research designed
to collect and organize legal data, to expound legal rules, and to explicate or offer exegesis upon
authoritative legal sources," while theoretical work is understood as "research designed to yield
a unifyinj theory or perspective by which legal rules may be understood, and their application
in particular cases evaluated and controlled." Law reform research is "designed to accomplish
change in the law," and fundamental research is "designed to secure a deeper understanding of
law as a social phenomenon, including research on the historical, philosophical, linguistic, economic,
social or political implications of law."
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conventional research, the perspective is internal to the law. It adopts
the basic assumptions of the legal system and works within the framework
of the authoritative sources as defined by the legal system. At the other
extreme, defined by fundamental research, the perspective is largely
external to the legal system, treating law as a social phenomenon, any
aspect of which is open to question and challenge. The former kind
of work will be termed "traditional," the latter "non-traditional."
Law and Learning concludes that the great majority of Canadian
legal scholarship is traditional.3 This conclusion flowed naturally from
the mandate and methodology of the Consultative Group. Their terms
of reference focussed their attention upon legal research and education
in the context of faculties of law, and this in turn shaped the methodology
of their research. A survey was done of writing appearing largely in
law journals and texts, with no attention paid to work published in non-
legal journals, nor presumably in texts produced by non-lawyers. Although
the Report notes this fact with regret4 the background paper on legal
research prepared for the Report observed that to have broadened the
data base would not have produced "a significantly different profile of
legal research publication than that produced by the survey conducted."s
However true this might be in other areas of law6 it is somewhat
misleading in the area of constitutional scholarship. The subject of the
Constitution has always attracted the interest of scholars in other
disciplines, thereby bringing to the literature a diversity of theoretical
perspectives and research methodologies. Were this work to have been
factored into the survey, a different picture of constitutional scholarship
would have emerged. Nevertheless, most writing about constitutional
law (as opposed to writing about constitutional issues more broadly) has
been produced by lawyers and most of it would fall within the category
of traditional scholarship. In the paragraphs that follow, I attempt to
explain why this is so.
B. Formative Influences on Constitutional Scholarship
Just as modern theories of rhetoric place the concept of the audience
at the centre of the scholarly inquiry,7 one cannot overstate the influence
3 Ibid. at 6.
4 Ibid at 75.
5 A.H. Janisch, Profile of Published Legal Research (1982) at 2.
6 At least one commentator has criticized Law and Learning for its failure to have considered
non-lawyers' writing about law. See R.P. Saunders, "Review" (1984) 16 Ottawa L.R. 218 at 221-
22.
7 On the importance of the audience to rhetorical theory, see C. Perelman & L. Olbrechts-
Tyteca, The New Rhetoric (1969) especially Part One.
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of the audience on the kind of constitutional scholarship produced in
Canada. The values, expectations, and needs of the audience shape the
form and content of any purposive discourse, defining the issues deemed
relevant, the sources of information deemed admissible, and the range
of solutions deemed plausible. Yet notwithstanding the variety of potiential
audiences for scholarship on constitutional matters,8 the dominant pro-
ducers of, and audiences for, writing about constitutional law have been
the legal community. This has influenced the type of work produced
in Canada considerably.
In the early decades of this century, lawyers, historians, and political
scientists worked together in the same university departments, with
constitutional law being a major part of the intellectual agenda within
the university. In such an environment, constitutional lawyers could feel
comfortable in tackling the large questions of political theory, as Professor
Kennedy did in his well-known Kirby Lectures.9 Moreover, both lawyers
and political scientists were concerned, in part, with the same issues,
thereby providing the possibility of a cross-fertilization of views and
perspectives. But beginning in the 1930s, the political science departments
gradually lost their lawyers to departments and faculties of law. Ac-
cordingly, political scientists began to turn away from the study of legal
phenomena and to focus more on the empirical study of politics, thereby
defining political science as a distinct discipline.lo It was not until the
1960s, and then only in a relatively small way, that political scientists
returned to the study of the legal aspects of the Constitution. As a result,
for a significant period of time, scholarship about constitutional law was
8 The nature of any given subject matter will dictate the range of possible audiences to which
scholarship might be directed, and in the case of constitutional law, the range is potentially very
broad. One set of audiences will be those whose job it is to work with the rules and principles
of constitutional law. These "natural consumers" include the bench, bar, and government, as well
as students of the subject. Another obvious audience will be the community of academic lawyers,
for which much academic writing is produced. Another potential audience is the academic community
more generally; unlike other areas of law, where the lawyers appear to be the only constituency
interested in the subject, constitutional issues would appear to be important to scholars working
in such disciplines as philosophy, political science, economics, sociology, and history. Finally, fueled
no doubt by the debate concerning patriation and the entrenchment of the Charter, there is a
growing interest on the part of the public in matters constitutional, and recent years have seen
a flurry of writing directed to this particular audience. See, for example, D.A. Milne, The New
Canadian Constitution (1982); R. Sheppard & M. Valpy, The National Deal (1982).
9 W.P.M. Kennedy, Some Aspects of the Theories and Workings of Constitutional Law (1931).
1o This account is drawn from Russell, "The Constitution, Courts and Judicial Behaviour"
(unpub.). Russell suggests a number of additional reasons for this withdrawal of interest by political
scientists in constitutional law, among which was a perception that, given the apparent rise of
central power during and after World War II and the increased use of intergovernmental,
administrative, and fiscal mechanisms to circumvent the division of powers in the Constitution,
the courts had become virtually irrelevant.
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largely in the hands of a small number of full-time academic lawyers,
working in isolation from their former colleagues in other disciplines.
This disassociation undermined the potential for interdisciplinary
work on constitutional law; lawyers would no longer expect to find
assistance in the work of political scientists and others as their intellectual
agendas had diverged. As well, it reinforced the doctrinal, court-focussed
perspective of the academic lawyer, a perspective that is a natural product
of the education and orientation of lawyers., Moreover, the movement
of lawyers into professional faculties of law during this period might
very well have blunted the impact that the emerging Realist movement
in the United States could have had on the kinds of work produced.,2
This was a function of the relatively unstable and unclear position of
academic lawyers within the profession of law.
As Law and Learning documents, the full-time legal academic is
a relatively recent phenomenon in Canada, and there is a need felt by
many legal academics to be perceived as "equal partners" with the bench
and bar. Given the historic distrust (if not indeed outright hostility) of
our legal tradition to matters theoretical,,3 academic lawyers are subject
to the pressure of proving their value to the audiences whose approval
and acceptance would validate academics' roles within the legal system.
Notwithstanding certain signs that the role of the academic is being
appreciated by the bench to a greater degree than ever before,', the pressure
to "belong" continues to exert a powerful force on the kinds of work
produced by academic lawyers.
II One need not dwell at length on the question of the training of lawyers, as this has been
addressed comprehensively in the literature. See, for example, Law and Learning, supra note 1,
ch. 4. It is sufficient to note that legal education continues to emphasize the courts as the focal
point of study and to emphasize doctrinal analysis over other forms of analysis. This results in
a scholarly agenda that is defined, in large measure, by what courts are doing and how they appear
to be doing it, and the work is produced by scholars who, by and large, lack rigorous training
in anything but law. This training tends to incline the academic lawyer towards an identification
with the bench and bar, in part as a way to rationalize what the academic lawyer can do best.
. 12 The impact of the realist movement can be seen in a number of Canadian works. See,
for example, J.R. Mallory, Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada (1954); E. McWhinney,
Judicial Review in the English-Speaking World (1956). The fact remains, however, that the bulk
of Canadian legal scholarship was not as heavily influenced by the realist perspective as was American
scholarship. One reason might be that American legal academics had already established themselves
in university-based law schools by the time of the realist challenge. As such, they might have
been more able to embrace realism than were their Canadian counterparts, whose struggle for
legitimacy (in the eyes of the profession) was more pronounced.
13 The aversion to theory can be traced to our English legal heritage. See eg., R.B.M. Cotterrell,
"English Conceptions of the Role of Theory in Legal Analysis" (1983) 46 Mod. L. Rev. 681.
14 For example, in a recent speech to the mid-winter meeting of the Canadian Bar Association
in Edmonton, Feb. 2, 1985, Chief Justice Dickson called upon the academic community to assist
the bench in coming to grips with the challenges posed by the Charter. One also detects a greater
use of academic writing by the Supreme Court in its reasons for judgment.
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At the same time, academic lawyers have to justify their roles as
members of a university community. The work of the courts is the natural
focus for the academic lawyer, inasmuch as it legitimates the legal system
with which academic lawyers (and their students) largely identify, and
stakes out a territory of inquiry that differentiates the academic study
of law from other disciplines within the university. The way to accom-
modate the conflicting demands of the profession and the university is,
for most academic lawyers, to take a perspective on the work of the
courts that, while critical of how the courts perform in constitutional
matters, did not question the larger issues of the legitimacy of constitutional
review or of the constitutional order itself. In this way, the orientation
of most academic writing by lawyers remains largely professional.'5
These factors shape the expectations about scholarship that are held
within the community of academic lawyers, but there the issue becomes
more complicated. Most writing by academic lawyers is aimed at the
audience of other academic lawyers. In order to secure tenure, to rise
to the status of full professor, or to move to a more prestigious law
faculty, a body of writing must be produced that will be evaluated by
other academics. To the extent that such academics have a professional
orientation, this will tend to exert some influence on the type of work
pursued. However, at any given time, there will be a strand of scholarship
that challenges the dominant approach to scholarship practised within
the academic community. One way to make one's reputation is to argue
that the conventional approaches to a subject are somehow intellectually
wanting.6 The quality of such arguments aside, the success of such efforts
will depend upon there being a critical mass of like-minded scholars
in the field, or at least a sufficient number of scholars either tolerant
1s Material considerations reinforce this professional identification. Academic lawyers are
constantly being called upon to render practical assistance to the profession and government in
the form of providing legal opinions and serving as constitutional advisers, serving on or writing
for government commissions examining constitutional issues, and serving as adjudicators in the
human rights field. Both the prestige and remuneration associated with these activities plays a
role in contributing to the professional orientation of many academic lawyers, as do the structures
of funding available for legal research generally. See, generally, Law and Learning, supra note
I at 87-129.
16 1 do not want to be understood as implying that no scholar ever asks a question or writes
an article without some financial or careerist motive. This would not be an accurate assessment,
for one of the more obvious audiences for scholarship is the person doing the writing. To the
extent that work is done "to please oneself," it might be thought to fall outside the gravitational
pull of these factors. But it cannot escape entirely. We are all products of our training and background,
and we are influenced by the expectations of those whom we respect. Moreover, we are rarely
aware of all that motivates us to act as we do. Even as we write "for ourselves," the "ourselves"
is a product of and reaction to the factors sketched above.
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of such work or sufficiently insecure about the integrity of the more
traditional forms of work, to embrace these scholarly efforts. Accordingly,
there will always be a body of work that attempts to push the intellectual
agenda beyond the issues conventionally addressed in the literature. But
in a relatively small community of legal scholars such as Canada, there
will never be more than a handful of people doing work of this kind.
Therefore, most of the constitutional scholarship produced by lawyers
in Canada will tend to be of a traditional kind.
C. On Traditional Scholarship
The general issue that defines traditional work is a search for the
meaning of the Constitution for those called upon to work with its terms.
The centrality of this issue flows from the professional orientation of
most producers and consumers of research in constitutional law, and
this in turn shapes the methodologies by which this issue is addressed.
In the early decades after Confederation, three methodologies
dominated most constitutional scholarship, and although some of the
concrete issues have changed over time, these approaches continue to
define most traditional writing in the subject. The first was an historical
approach, the objects usually being to understand both the meaning of
the text and the extent to which Confederation represented a continuation
of or deviation from our English constitutional heritage.17 The second
approach may be termed textual exegesis, understood as the search for
the meaning of the Constitution through an analysis of the words of
the text.,8 As judicial precedents began to accrete around the provisions
of the Constitution, the focus of the writing became more doctrinal.
Some of this writing was largely expository,,9 but at least since the 1930s,
when the province-building implications of the work of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council became dramatically clear, the dominant
focus of doctrinal analysis has been and remains more analytical and
critical.20
17 See, for example, A.R. Hassard, Canadian Constitutional History and Law (1900). A good
deal of this kind of work was highly expository - little more than historical reportage. Some
of the later work of an historical kind was more analytical and critical. See, for example, W.P.M.
Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada (1922).
18 Typically, the textual approach was combined with an historical approach. See, for example,
W.R. Riddell, The Constitution of Canada (1917).
'9 See, for example, A.H.F. Lefroy, The Law of Legislative Power in Canada (1897-98); W.H.P.
Clement, The Law of the Canadian Constitution, 3d ed. (1916).
20 See, generally, A.C. Cairns, "The Judicial Committee and Its Critics" (1971) 4 Can. J.
Pol. Sc. at 301.
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Making due allowance for the distortion that any generalization
produces, it is possible to identify four general issues around which most
of this writing revolves. The first, as noted above, concerns the meaning
of the provisions of the Constitution. Work of this kind constitutes a
large portion of the writing on our recent constitutional amendments,
the work blending the historical, textual, and doctrinal approaches.2- The
second issue that defines much traditional scholarship concerns the internal
consistency of the judicial opinion: considerable energy has been and
continues to be devoted to showing how a given decision did or did
not follow from the putative imperatives of the text, history, or earlier
cases. In many ways, this kind of work is what lawyers do best, and
writings exploring these two themes probably constitute the majority of
scholarship of a traditional kind. The third theme is a concern for the
proper approach to the judicial interpretation of the Constitution: can
and should courts restrict themselves to the text and doctrines, or should
they interpret the Constitution in light of the social exigencies of the
times? This competition between what we might term the formalist and
realist approaches has been played out rather inconclusively since the
first attacks of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.22 Finally,
attention is focussed on the attitude that courts ought to take to their
function in the light of the competing demands of other governmental
institutions, the issue typically framed as a choice between activism or
restraint.23 As we move from the first to the fourth theme, the work
becomes less conventional and more theoretical.
Pursuing these themes, Canadian scholars have produced work of
exceptional quality in terms both of its clarity and analytical rigour, and
in terms of its utility to the legal profession, government, and the academic
community generally. Good textbooks have been published in both
English and French, and most doctrinal issues in constitutional law have
21 On the Charter, see, for example, W.S. Tarnopolsky & G.A. Beaudoin, Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedor" Commentary (1982). On the resource amendment to section 92, see, for
example, W.D. Moull, "Section 92A of the Constitution Act, 1867" (1983) 61 Can. B. Rev. 715.
22 See Cairns, supra note 20. See also D.W. Mundell, "Tests for the Validity of Legislation
under the B.N.A. Act" (1954) 32 Can. B. Rev. 813; cf B. Laskin, "Tests for the Validity of Legislation:
What's the 'Matter'?" (1955-56) 11 U. Toronto LJ. 114.
23 Although the issue has figured in the scholarship concerning the division of powers, see
infra note 25, it has come to the fore in the writings on the Charter. The majority of writings
by lawyers seems to call for an activist court. See, for example, M. Manning, Rights Freedoms
and the Courts (1982); Cf M. Gold, "A Principled Approach to Equality Rights: A Preliminary
Inquiry" (1982) 4 Supreme Court L.R. 131.
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been subjected to extensive treatment in the periodical literature.24 Indeed,
the work of the Supreme Court in constitutional matters is now subjected
to annual comment in the Supreme Court Law Review, and the work
to date has been of the highest quality. Moreover, the literature contains
a number of divergent views on both the nature of constitutional law
and on the appropriate role of the courts, thereby providing a variety
of perspectives on the subject.5
Furthermore, there appears to be a trend among lawyers to produce
more work of a theoretical kind. Professor Weiler's In the Last Resort
deserves special mention, for while the analytical tools employed were
not necessarily original to the author, the book was an original attempt
to approach the work of the Supreme Court from a jurisprudential and
institutional perspective. More recently, the decision of the Supreme Court
in the first patriation reference6 generated a body of writing that raised
fundamental questions about the role of the Court and the conceptions
of law that underlay the opinions in that case.27 Indeed, in an important
article, Professor Slattery uses the patriation issue as a device to challenge
the conventional wisdom concerning the juridical basis of Canadian
constitutional law.28 This is work of a traditional kind, as defined by
24 The leading modem textbooks include P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (1985),
and H. Brun & G. Tremblay, Droit Constitutionnel (1982). For examples of work on more specific
issues, in the area of native rights, the scholarship combines careful textual and doctrinal analysis
with a sensitivity to history and, in some cases, to legal theory. See, for example, B. Slattery, "The
Constitutional Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" (1982-83) 8 Queens L.i. 232, and articles
referred to in n. 1 therein. In the scholarship concerning issues of natural resources, we find detailed
analyses of the legal questions informed by an appreciation of the political and economic consequences
of the judicial, inter-governmental, and constitutional developments in the area. See, for example,
W.D. Moull, "Natural Resources: The Other Crisis in Canadian Federalism" (1980) 18 Osgoode
Hall L.i. 1.
25 For example, Professor Hogg's work draws upon an essentially positivist image of law and
an argument for judicial restraint. See Hogg, ibid. As a counterpoint to Hogg's approach, the writings
of Professor Lederman offer a perspective rooted in a more sociological conception of law and
a belief in the virtues of a more activist role for the courts. See, generally, W.R. Lederman, Continuing
Canadian Constitutional Dilemmas (1981). A similar approach characterizes the work of Professor
Lyon. See, for example, J.N. Lyon, "The Central Fallacy of Canadian Constitutional Law" (1976)
22 McGill LJ. 40. See also J.N. Lyon & R.G. Atkey, Canadian Constitutional Law in a Modem
Perspective (1970). For an approach generally more critical of the Supreme Court's work in
constitutional matters, see P.C. Weiler, "The Supreme Court and The Law of Canadian Federalism"
(1973) 23 U. Toronto LJ. 307.
26 Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Nos. 1, 2 and 3) (1981) 125 D.L.R.
(3d) 1.
27 See, for example, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations (Queens Univ.), The Court and
the Constitution (1982); P. Hogg, Comment (1982) 60 Can. B. Rev. 307; B. Schwartz & J.D. Whyte,
"The Patriation References and the Idea of Canada" (1982-83) 8 Queens L.i. 158; E. Colvin,
"Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1982) 4 Supreme Court L.R.
3; G. Rdmillard, "Legality, Legitimacy and the Supreme Court", in K.G. Banting & R. Simeon,
And No One Cheered Federalism, Democracy and the Constitution Act (1983) 189; P. Blache, "La
Cour supr6me et le rapatriement de la constitution: l'impact des perceptions diffdrentes de la question"
(1981) 22 C. de D. 649.
28 B. Slattery, "The Independence of Canada" (1983) 5 Supreme Court L.R. 369.
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Law and Learning, but in offering us a redefinition of the jurisprudential
foundations of Canadian constitutional law, it is theoretical work of the
highest quality.
The burgeoning literature on the Charter also contains some work
of a theoretical kind.29 Attempts have been made to offer courts a
theoretical perspective within which they should approach the interpre-
tation of the Charter,3o while a recent piece on the scope of the Charter
attempts to illuminate the competing images of political association
underlying the now flourishing debate.3' With respect to the value of
the Charter, a number of articles have provided provocative counterpoints
to the general enthusiasm with which most academic lawyers have
embraced the Charter.32 In addition, there is the beginning of a feminist
29 It must be conceded that a lot of this writing is highly expository and somewhat pedestrian
in ambition and execution. This can be explained, in part, by the fact that it has been very much
a producers' market: every journal and book publisher appears eager to have work published on
the Charter. As well, a fair bit of this writing undoubtedly originated as continuing education pieces
for the bench and bar;, work of this kind tends to be narrower in scope than writing aimed more
directly at an academic audience. By focussing on work of a more theoretical kind, however, I
do not mean to deprecate the value of the better conventional writings on the subject. By marshalling
arguments based on the text, its legislative history, and the jurisprudence from other jurisdictions,
such writing provides valuable information and analysis to those called upon to work with the
Charter.
30 On the interpretation of the Charter generally, see, for example, N. Lyon, "The Charter
as a Mandate for New Ways of Thinking About Law" (1983-84) 9 Queens L. 241; N. Lyon,
"The Teleological Mandate of the Fundamental Freedoms Guarantee: What to do with Vague
but Meaningful Generalities" (1982) 4 Supreme Court L.R. 57; H.S. Fairley, "Enforcing the Charter.
Some Thoughts on an Appropriate and Just Standard for Judicial Review" (1982) 4 Supreme Court
L.R. 217. On the interpretation of the guarantees of freedom of.expression, see, for example, C.F.
Beckton, "Obscenity and Censorship Re-examined under the Charter of Rights" (1983) 13 Man.
LJ. 351. On the interpretation of the equality rights guarantees, see, for example, A.F. Bayefsky,
"Defining Equality Rights," in A.F. Bayefsky & M. Eberts, eds. Equaity Rights and Canadian Charter
of Rights (1985) 1; P. Blache, "Equality and reverse discrimination: the application of section 15(2)
of the Charter," in J.M.P. Weiler & R.M. Elliot, eds. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Litigating the Values of a Nation (1985, forthcoming); W.W. Black, "Intent or Effects - Section
15", in Weiler and Elliot, ibid.; Gold, supra note 23.
31 J.D. Whyte, "The Application of the Charter to the Private Sector" (Presented at the National
Symposium on Equality Rights, Toronto, 1985).
32 See, for example, R.A. Macdonald, "Postscript and Prelude - the Jurisprudence of the Charter.
Eight Theses" (1982) 4 Supreme Court L.R. 321; R.A. Samek, "Untrenching Fundamental Rights"
(1982) 27 McGill LJ. 755; P.H. Russell, "The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms" (1983) 61 Can. B. Rev. 30; P. Fitzgerald, "Canadian Rights and Freedoms -
First Class or Charter?" (1983) 13 Man. LJ. 277; H.W. MacLauchlan, "Review" (1984) 33 U.N.B.LJ.
385; P.C. Weiler, "Rights and Judges in Democracy: A New Canadian Version" (1984) 18 J.
of Law Ref. 5 1. Some of the best of the critiques of the Charter were published before the Charter
was entrenched. See, for example, D.V. Smiley, "The Case against the Canadian Charter of Human
Rights" (1969) 2 Can. J. Pol Sc. 277; P.H. Russell, "A Democratic A proach to Civil Liberties"
(1969) 19 U. Toronto L2. 109; D.A. Schmeiser, "The Case Against Entrenchment of a Canadian
Bill of Rights" (1973) 1 Dal. LJ. 15.
In general, there seems to be a greater enthusiasm for the Charter among academic lawyers
than one finds in the writings of political scientists. This likely reflects the lawyers' faith in the
ability of the legal process to handle the complex issues of social policy (and philosophy) implicated
by the Charter.
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literature on constitutional issues in Canada that promises to challenge
some of the basic assumptions of the more conventional writings on
the subject.33
The great strength of traditional scholarship lies in its critical analysis
of the performance of the courts, its attempt to offer the bench and
bar a coherent framework within which the Constitution can be inter-
preted, and its close attention to issues surrounding the meaning of the
provisions of the Constitution. Indeed, as I suggest in Part III, work of
this kind is a necessary part of any serious attempt to understand
constitutional law. It does, however, have its limitations.34
In general terms, these limitations are related to the nature of the
professional audiences to which most traditional work, whether explicitly
or implicitly, is aimed. Because these audiences are both consumers and
proponents of constitutional argumentation, traditional scholarship tends
to fall within what Paul Brest has called "advocacy scholarship."3 The
work rarely stands back to evaluate the nature of the arguments forwarded
33 See, for example, K.E. Mahoney, "Obscenity, Morals and the Law: A Feminist Critique"
(1985) 17 Ottawa L. Rev. 33; Charter of Rights Educational Fund, Report on the Statute Audit
Project (1985). As well, the recently created Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, the first
volume of which will be devoted to equality theory, is likely to be a place where scholarship
informed by feminist theories will appear. For a recent attempt to apply feminist theories to a
reconstruction of American constitutional law, see K.L. Karst, "Woman's Constitution" [1984] Duke
LJ. 447.
34 Some of these limitations appear to be a function of certain facts unique to the Canadian
situation, rather than flowing from the nature of traditional scholarship itself. Unlike the situation
in the United States, Canadian academic lawyers tend to work in isolation in the sense that we
do not subject each others' work to regular and sustained criticism in the literature. To be sure,
interested scholars occasionally address each other's work in a critical way, but such occasions,
usually in the form of short book reviews, are all too infrequent and episodic. One reason may
be that Canadian scholars simply do not produce work with the same theoretical pretensions -
I use the term in its French sense - as do their American counterparts. As such, there is not
as much grist for the critical mill. Moreover, the influence of constitutional theorists on the work
of the courts has been less apparent in Canada than in the United States, thereby making it less
obvious that something practical is at stake in analyzing and criticizing such work. Finally, we
confront the bald fact of numbers: the community of Canadian constitutional scholars is tiny as
compared with the American. Although scholars in both countries are called upon to perform a
variety of service functions to government, thereby channelling energy away from pure scholarship,
the impact on Canadian scholarship is more extreme given our size. For these reasons, there simply
is not enough scholarship about scholarship.
In addition, there is a tendency among too many English-speaking scholars to ignore the work
being produced in Quebec in French. Most of the Quebec scholarship is very traditional in focus,
but is characterized by clarity and intellectual rigour. In certain respects, some of the work provides
a perspective on constitutional issues that non-Quebec scholars must take into account. See, for
example, D. Latouche, "Les Calculs Strategiques derriere le 'Canada Bill"' (1982) 45:4 Law &
Contem. Prob. 165. Although ignorance of or difficulty with the French language explains why
most English-speaking academics do not refer to the work of their Quebec colleagues, it does
not justify it. Greater efforts must be made by English-speaking academics to acquaint themselves
with the scholarship from Quebec, and more moneys ought to be made available for the translation
of major works emanating from Quebec.
35 P. Brest, "The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship" (1981) 90 Yale LJ. 1063.
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or to assess the impact on the Canadian polity of having matters of
public importance debated and resolved through arguments. The almost
exclusive focus on constitutional arguments from a perspective internal
to the constitutional order suppresses the relevance of other issues that
flow from the practice of constitutional review by courts.
In specific terms, there is a tendency to treat the judicial opinion
as if it accurately reflected the reasoning processes of the court, rather
than viewing it in rhetorical terms as an example of how the court wants
itself to be perceived in making the decision. As well, there is virtually
no work focussing upon the impact of constitutional decisions or on
the compliance with them by other government institutions. As a result,
our understanding of the consequences of constitutional decisions is poor.
Further, insufficient attention is paid to the basic theoretical issues
implicated by the process of constitutional interpretation. Traditional
scholars tend to make arguments about how specific provisions ought
to be interpreted rather than evaluate the nature of the interpretive process
itself. Finally, to the extent that scholars are pursuing work of a theoretical
kind, virtually all of it tends to be of a justificatory, rather than explanatory
kind. Again, this leaves a gap in our understanding of constitutional law.
These themes are developed more fully in Part III, where I offer some
suggestions for work that could be done to remedy these limitations.
Before doing so, it is appropriate to consider the kind of scholarship
being done of a non-traditional kind.
D. Non- Traditional Scholarship
Law and Learning observes that very little work of a non-traditional
kind is being produced by legal academics in Canada. In the area of
constitutional scholarship, most of the non-traditional work is produced
by non-lawyers, and as such, it tends to focus on issues other than those
concerning the interpretation of the Constitution by the courts. Undoubt-
edly a function of the professional disassociation between academic
lawyers and those in other disciplines, this has resulted in such work
paying only marginal attention to the issues identified as the limitations
of traditional scholarship. Nonetheless, a good deal of this work would
fall within the category of fundamental research. For example, in the
area of federalism, the focus has not been on the problems associated
with judicial review under the Constitution, but on such issues as the
implications of the division of powers for the functioning of the Canadian
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economy,36 or for the adequate workings of a modem regulatory state
in economic matters.37 The intergovemmental conflict that has charac-
terized much of our history has been examined in terms of the apparent
logic of modem government3s and in the competition between the various
political cultures that constitute Canada.39
Scholarship of this kind is essential to a full understanding of the
constitutional order in Canada, and lawyers have a good deal to learn
from it. For example, the literature contains valuable contributions to
our understanding of the language within which constitutional issues are
conceived in Canada. It is commonplace that the language of federalism
has dominated the debates about fundamental political issues in Canada,
and scholars have provided a number of models of Canadian federalism
with which to better understand the debate.o And working within these
models, some important work has been produced. For example, Ramsay
Cook's historical study of the origins of the compact theory illuminates
the persistence of compact theory rhetoric in current debates about the
Constitution.,, As well, the identification and dominance of these various
models have enabled scholars to question the utility of framing our political
issues in these terms, for it is clear that the language of federalism has
functioned to suppress the rise in Canadian political debate of a focus
on what are deemed to be more fundamental issues of political economy.4 2
36 The classic study in the modem era remains A.E. Safarian, Canadian Federalism and Economic
Integration (1974). A number of writers have examined the extent to which provincial laws and
policies inhibit the development of a common market in Canada. See, for example, Ontario Economic
Council, Intergovernmental Relations (1977). For an overview of the fiscal relations between the
provincial and federal governments, see, for example, P. Lewis, "The Tangled Tale of Taxes and
Transfers," in Fraser Institute, Canadian Confederation at the Crossroads (1978) 39. On the economics
of Canadian federalism generally, see D.V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties
(1980) ch.6.
37 See, for example, A.G. CarelessInitiative andResponse: TheAdaptation ofCanadian Federalism
to Regional Economic Development (1977).
38 A.C. Cairns, "The Other Crisis of Canadian Federalism" (1979) 22 Can. Pub. Adm. 175.
39 See, for example, D. Bell & L. Tepperman, The Roots of Disunity (1979). Respecting the
role of Quebec within Canadian federalism, see, for example, K. McRoberts & D. Posgate, Quebec
Social Change and Political Crisis, rev'd ed. (1980); E. McWhinney, Quebec and the Constitution
1960-1978 (1979). For an explanation of Quebec's language laws in terms of both demographic
and ideological changes in Quebec, see, for example, H. Guindon, "The Modernization of Quebec
and the Legitimacy of the Canadian State," in D. Glenday, H. Guindon & A. Turowetz, eds.,
Modernization and the Canadian State (1978) 212. On Quebec ideologies more generally, see D.
Monibre, Ideologies in Quebec: The Historical Development (1981). For excellent analyses of the
rise of western nationalism in Canada, see Mallory, supra note 12; J. Richards & L. Pratt, Prairie
Capitalism Power and Influence in the New West (1979).
40 See, for example, E.R. Black, Divided Loyalties (1975); J.R. Mallory, "The Five Faces of
Federalism," in P.-A. Crepeau & C.B. Macpherson, eds., The Future of Canadian Federalism (1965)
3; G. Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union (1979).
41 R. Cook, Provincial Autonomy, Minority Rights and the Compact Theory, 1867-1921 (1969).
42 See, for example, Black, supra note 40, ch. 1.
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In this regard, some recent work represents a promising rapprochement
between the interests of lawyers and non-lawyers. For example, Richard
Simeon's recent attempt to elucidate the values implicated in debates
about Canadian federalism is a step towards expanding the language
of discourse within which the issues traditionally have been addressed.,3
Professor Monahan's efforts to reveal the conflicting visions of federalism
embodied within constitutional doctrine itself offers a provocative chal-
lenge to the integrity of the adjudicative process in constitutional matters.",
More generally, with the non-lawyers' return to an interest in law
has come a greater convergence of the agendas of legal and non-legal
academics, evident in the writings on patriation and the Charter. With
respect to patriation, the work of lawyers tended to focus on the
jurisprudential underpinnings of the Supreme Court's opinions in the
Patriation Reference.s (A notable exception to this focus on the Court,
and a partial antidote to the lack of explanatory theory is the attempt
by Professors Glasbeek and Mandel to explain patriation and the
entrenchment of the Charter in neo-Marxist terms.)6 Non-lawyers,
although not indifferent to the role of the Supreme Court in the patriation
process;I7 have to concentrate more on the historical and political forces
that shaped the process., This kind of work promises greater dialogue
between the disciplines, as each brings its own distinct perspective to
bear upon the same subject matter.
The work of political scientists regarding the Charter tends to
downplay the analysis of the meaning of various provisions in the Charter,
focussing instead on the impact of the Charter on the traditional image
of the judiciary, on the possible influence of the Charter on the de-
velopment of a more national political consciousness in Canada, and
on the impact that the Charter might have more generally on the way
43 R.E. Simeon, "Criteria for Choice in Federal Systems" (1982-83) 8 Queens LJ. 131.
44 PJ. Monahan, "At Doctrine's Twilight: The Structure of Canadian Federalism" (1984) 34
U. Toronto Li. 47.
45 Supra note 27.
46 H. Glasbeek & M. Mandel, "The Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1984) 2:2 Socialist Studies 84.
47 See, for example, "The Supreme Court Decision: Bold Statescraft based on Questionable
Jurisprudence," in Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, supra note 27, 1; S.V. LaSelva, "Federalism
and Unanimity: The Supreme Court and Constitutional Amendment" (1983) 16 Can. J. of Pol.
Sc. 757; R. Knopff, "Legal Theory and the 'Patriation' Debate" (1981) 7 Queens LJ. 41.
48 See, for example, Banting & Simeon, supra note 27; F. Sabetti, "The Historical Context
of Constitutional Change in Canada" (1982) 45:4 Law & Contem. Prob. 11; J.R. Mallory, "The
Politics of Constitutional Change" (1982) 45:4 Law & Contem. Prob. 53.
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in which politics is practised in Canada.,9 While much of this writing
is more speculative than empirical at this point, it does raise important
issues that more traditional work tends to neglect. As further evidence
of a convergence in intellectual agendas, one should note the growing
interest of non-lawyers in the issue of judicial reasoning about rights,
as a recent article by Professors Morton and Pal exemplifies.5o
A most encouraging development is the willingness of both academic
lawyers and scholars in other disciplines to tackle the question of
constitutional rights from a philosophical perspective. For example, in
attempting to construct a philosophically coherent approach to funda-
mental rights, Professor Conklin has addressed the normative foundations
of the idea of fundamental rights , while Professor Smith has approached
the issue from the perspective of modem analytical philosophy.52 In
contrast, Professor Samek has been concerned with the ideological
dimensions inherent in entrenching rights in the Constitution,53 an issue
also noted by Professor Macdonald.5, In more specific areas, lawyers
and non-lawyers are addressing the issues of equality5s and collective
rights56 in an effort to understand their philosophical implications.
Law and Learning summarizes its survey of legal scholarship by
observing that "mediocrity prevails, with certain exceptions."57 At least
as applied to constitutional scholarship, I do not agree. To be sure, in
49 See, for example, A.C. Cairns, "The Canadian Constitutional Experiment" (1984) 9 Dal.
LJ. 87; D. Smiley, "A Dangerous Deed: The Constitution Act, 1982," in Banting & Simeon, supra
note 27,74; P.H. Russell, "The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the Policy-Making Role of Canadian
Courts" (1982) 25 Can. Pub. Admin. 1.
50 F.L. Morton and L.A. Pal, "The Impact of the Charter of Rights on Public Administration"
(1985) 28 Can. Pub. Admin. 221.
51 W.E. Conklin, In Defence of Fundamental Rights (1979). See also W.E. Conklin, "The
Utilitarian Theory of Equality Before the Law" (1976) 8 Ottawa L.R. 485.
52 J.C. Smith, Legal Obligation (1976). See also R.E. Robinson, S.C. Coval & J.C. Smith, "The
Logic of Rights" (1983) 33 U. Toronto LJ. 267.
53 Samek, supra note 32.
54 Macdonald, supra note 32.
55 See, for example, Vickers, "Equality Theories and Their Results," in Smith et aL, eds.,
Righting the Balance" Canada's New Equality Rights (1985, forthcoming); M. Gold, "Equality Before
the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada: A Case Study" (1980) 18 Osgoode Hall LJ. 336 at
358-70.
56 See, for example, M. McDonald, "The Rights of People and the Rights of a People," in
S.G. French, ed., Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation (1979) 333; M. McDonald, "Aboriginal
Rights," in W.R. Shea & J. King-Farlow, eds., Contemporary Issues in Political Philosophy (1976)
27; P. Carignan, "De la notion de droit collectif et de son application en mati6re scolaire au Quebec"
(1984) 18 RJ.T. 1.
57 Law and Learning, supra note I at 75. Part of this assessment would appear to flow from
the Report's general dissatisfaction with the utility of traditional scholarship per se, a dissatisfaction
that informs much of the Report notwithstanding occasional disclaimers to the contrary. The question
of the value of traditional scholarship is addressed infra, in Part II(1).
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strictly quantitative terms, a considerable body of writing would have
to be judged as mediocre by any reasonable standard. Given the
proliferation ofjournals within which work can be published, it is inevitable
that work of an ordinary kind appears with some frequency. A good
deal of writing is produced by and for the practising bar, and this work
tends to be either expository or little more than embellished appellate
briefs. While this work is of some value to the practising lawyer, it hardly
advances one's understanding beyond the obvious. Add to this the almost
obsessive demand of law journals and book publishers for anything written
about the Charter, however pedestrian, and the picture can look awfully
grim. Nevertheless, this should not obscure the fact that Canadian scholars
have produced a significant body of work of considerable quality.
Although traditional scholarship continues to dominate the writings
of academic lawyers, it is increasingly theoretical in approach. As well,
a growing number of academic lawyers appear to be producing work
of a non-traditional kind. Non-lawyers continue to provide valuable
contributions to our understanding of the constitutional order from a
variety of intellectual perspectives, and the number of non-lawyers
interested in the legal dimensions of the Constitution appears to be
increasing. From all of this, clearly there are reasons to be fairly optimistic
about the future of constitutional scholarship in Canada.
II. THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARSHIP
The object of this part is to suggest certain areas where future research
could profitably be directed. In general terms my prescription is a familiar
one, for I believe that we must take steps to increase the amount of
inter-disciplinary work done on constitutional issues. Here, however, we
must temper aspiration with realism. Notwithstanding the renewed interest
in law among academics in other disciplines, most writing on constitutional
law will likely be produced by legal academics, and given the training
and orientation of lawyers, work of a traditional kind will continue to
define much of the scholarship. If this is correct, it seems appropriate
to begin with some thoughts on the future and value of traditional
scholarship.
A. The Future of Traditional Scholarship
Although this article calls for more work of a non-traditional kind
to be pursued by constitutional scholars in Canada, nothing is meant
to imply that scholars should abandon the more traditional forms of
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writing. In instrumental terms alone, the audiences who benefit from
such work deserve the assistance it provides. Lawyers will continue to
argue cases, judges will continue to render decisions in constitutional
matters, and governments will continue to have to respect the confines,
however elastic, of the constitutional order. In this respect, those engaged
in traditional scholarship function, in the best sense of the word, as the
rhetoricians of the constitutional system: they provide the critical analysis
of the language within which constitutional change is justified. It would
be the height of irresponsibility to suggest that those with the greatest
claim to expertise about the workings of the constitutional rules should
abandon their efforts to assist the bench, bar, and government in the
tasks they confront.
Moreover, the existence of a body of such work is a necessary
precondition for the creation of other forms of scholarship about con-
stitutional law, for only by working with the legal materials "on their
own terms" can one appreciate both the limitations inherent in such
efforts and the larger issues that need to be addressed. For example,
the need for some theory or theories of equality only becomes clear
when one has tried to answer specific questions on the basis of an analysis
of the text and its legislative history alone.58 Only by beginning with
more traditional forms of analysis can one appreciate both the need for
and the directions of further scholarly inquiry.
This having been said, it is incumbent on scholars pursuing traditional
work to free themselves from an unreal conception of how judges decide
constitutional cases. Judges do not decide cases exclusively, or indeed
not even primarily, on the basis of logical consistency in doctrine.59 Judges
worry about the implications of their decisions for the workings of other
governmental institutions, on the court's own credibility, on the proper
balance between central and provincial power, on the appropriate limits
(or duties) on government towards individuals and collectivities, and so
on. To the extent that traditional scholarship is to provide real assistance
to its various audiences, it should focus on the consequences of various
lines of doctrinal development, make more explicit the value choices
58 M. Gold, "Moral and Political Theories in Equality Rights Adjudication," in Weiler & Elliot,
supra note 30.
59 One need go no further than the performance of the Supreme Court of Canada with respect
to the peace, order, and good government clause of the Constitution to see how apparently indifferent
the courts can be to even recently promulgated doctrine of their own creation. See, generally,
Hogg, supra note 24 at 375-83.
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implicit in the cases, and more generally, attempt to provide a broader
context within which the bench, bar, and government can appreciate
constitutional law.6o
B. On More and Better Theory
Notwithstanding some signs that more work of a theoretical kind
is being produced in Canada, especially in relation to the Charter, there
clearly is a need for more and better work of this kind. In many cases,
theory appears to be used as a substitute for doctrine in an effort to
provide concrete answers for lawyers and judges. In such endeavours,
there is an understandable tendency to invoke American theories with
insufficient attention paid to the differences between our legal cultures.6
More fundamentally, there is a lack of scholarship exploring the problems
associated with using theory 6s a guide to the judicial decision. How
does one choose and justify a particular theory as an appropriate reference
point, and can any such theory generate answers specific enough to assist
in the resolution of concrete cases?62 Until such work is done in Canada,
there is a very real danger that black-letter law will be replaced by
black-letter theory.3 It is imperative that lawyers, philosophers, and
sociologists assist one another in pursuing these theoretical issues.
In addition to work of this kind, there is a need for more theoretical
work of an explanatory, rather than justificatory kind. I have already
alluded to some work of this kind concerning inter-governmental conflict
in Canada6 and the patriation process,s but much more could be done
to relate constitutional developments to the social circumstances from
which they emerged. For example, much has been written about the
decentralizing thrust of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council's
interpretations of the British North America Ac 1867, but little has been
60 This appears especially important with respect to the Charter, as the Chief Justice himself
has acknowledged, supra note 14.
61 In fairness, many writers gesture towards this issue. See, for example, G.V. La Forest, "The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: An Overview" (1983) 61 Can. B. Rev. 19 at 24. As
well, the courts have made it clear that they are endeavouring to create a Canadian jurisprudence
of rights. See, ag., Regina v. Videoflicks LtdL et al (1984) 48 O.R. (2d) 395. Nevertheless, far too
little work is being done by academics to create such theories. I am hardly suggesting that we
would be better off by returning to the era where courts dismissed American ideas out of hand,
but we must do more and better work to create theories that speak to the unique features of
our society.
62 Gold, supra note 58.
63 The phrase is from R. Stevens, "American Legal Scholarship: Structural Constraints and
Intellectual Conceptualism" (1983) 33 J. Leg. Ed. 442 at 447.
6 Cairns, supra note 38.
65 Glasbeek & Mandel, supra note 46.
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written about the forces shaping the litigation that gave rise to these
province-building precedents. Many of the important cases turned on
provincial initiatives to raise revenue or to regulate commercial activity
under circumstances where the country was struggling through a severe
economic depression6 This legislation might be understood as a response,
in part, to the inability of the federal government to adequately fund
the needs of the provinces or to otherwise play a leading role in the
economic development of the country.67 if this view could be substantiated
through historical research, it would provide useful data from which one
could then examine the larger question of the relationship between
economic forces, legal initiatives, and constitutional evolution. Here, as
elsewhere, the skills of the lawyer must be combined with those of the
social historian and economist if such work is to yield helpful insights.
C. On the Impact and Importance of Constitutional Law
Although traditional scholarship does not want for a body of work
highly critical of the courts' performance, there is virtually no attempt
to assess either the impact of constitutional decisions or the compliance
with them by other government institutions.68 (Indeed, most writing tends
to overstate the significance of judicial decisions.) One might explain
this gap in the literature in a number of ways. In part, it follows from
an often inarticulated view of law as somehow autonomous from other
disciplines, a view that is related in some way to the idea that law is
self-executing. This view may have been reinforced by the institutional
disassocigtion of law from other disciplines mentioned above. Given that
lawyers had the field of constitutional law virtually to themselves for
much of our recent history, there was a lack of pressure from social
scientists concerned about the actual consequences of what courts do.
Explanations aside, this is not good enough.
Consider the impact of two major Supreme Court decisions con-
cerning constitutional jurisdiction over natural resources. The immediate
impact of the CIGOL decision was effectively avoided by the legislature
of Saskatchewan levying a tax on the profits of the oil companies69 while
66 See, for example, Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887) 12 App. Cas. 575.
67 The significance of the depression for the evolution of Canadian federalism has been noted
by a number of writers. See, for example, Careless, supra note 37 at 144; Mallory, supra note
12 at 33.
68 The point is noted by P.H. Russell, "The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms" (1983) 61 Can. B. Rev. 30 at 42.
69 Canadian Industrial Gas & Oil Ltd v. Government of Saskatchewan [1978] 2 S.C.R. 545.
On the aftermath of the case, see Moull, supra note 24 at 25-26.
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the doctrinal significance of the case has been rendered irrelevant by
the terms of the resource amendment to the Constitution.7o Respecting
the Court's decision vesting exclusive jurisdiction in Parliament over the
resources off-shore from Newfoundland,7' the impact has been blunted
by the political arrangement that followed between the federal government
and Newfoundland.72 To be sure, these decisions set the framework for
the subsequent political debate, and in this sense, had an impact, but
at the end of the day, the decisions were only of marginal significance.
The entrenchment of the Charter also raises a set of similar issues.
For example, consider the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the
Singh case, holding that the absence of an oral hearing in applications
for refugee status violated the right to fundamental justice.73 Notwith-
standing the apparent impact that this decision will have on the procedures
whereby immigration officials deal with the backlog of such applications,
it seems clear that the provision of an oral hearing would soon have
been legislated by Parliament in response to suggestions of a Task Force
and others74 In the long run, the impact of the Singh case on immigration
law is likely to be minimal.
Evaluating the impact of the Charter seems especially important
in the context of the legal rights guaranteed in sections 7 to 14. To
what extent have police departments and other investigative agencies
promulgated new rules for officials "in the field" in light of the legal
rights guaranteed by the Charter, and to what extent have these new
rules actually altered behaviour in the field? The latter issue clearly cannot
be addressed using traditional lawyers' skills alone: empirical research
on the actual impact of these Charter rights appears essential.
70 Section 92A of the Constitution Ac4 1982 provides, inter alia, that a province can legislate
in relation to the inter-provincial trade in non-renewable natural resources, and can levy indirect
taxes on those resources. For a careful analysis of these provisions, see Moull, supra note 21.
7' Reference Re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland (1984)
5 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
72 The "Atlantic Accord" on offshore oil and gas development, entered into by the governments
of Canada and Newfoundland, February It, 1985."
73 Singh et al v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [ 19851 1 S.C.R. 177.
74 A task force established in 1980 has recommended that a person claiming refugee status
should be given an oral hearing where the Refugee Status Advisory Committee is not prepared
to make a positive recommendation on the basis of the transcript of the claimant's examination
by an immigration officer. See Task Force on Immigration Practices and Procedures, The Refugee
Status Determination Process (1981). The same conclusion was reached in a report commissioned
by the Honourable John Roberts, the then Minister of Employment and Immigration. See E. Ratushny,
A New Refugee Status Determination Process for Canada (1984). The federal government is planning
to introduce legislation that will deal with the backlog of some twenty thousand cases where refugee
status has been claimed. "Bill promised to ease refugee backlog," Globe and Mail (22 May 1985)
3.
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In terms of the possibility of excluding evidence unconstitutionally
obtained, the Charter invites us to consider the impact of admitting or
excluding such evidence on the public's perception of the integrity of
the justice system.75 Absent some attempt to gauge such perceptions
empirically, notwithstanding the many difficulties associated with such
an effort76 the impact of the Charter in this area will remain largely
speculative. Work needs to be done to assess the impact that decisions
to exclude such evidence actually have on the outcome of cases. Although
the popular image may be one of the "criminal" going free, research
might disclose that evidence often is excluded because there is other
admissible evidence with which to convict the accused.- All of these
issues, when properly explored, might suggest that the impact of the
Charter is less dramatic than one might otherwise have thought.
D. On Interpretation and Rhetoric
Notwithstanding the fact that traditional scholarship places the
judicial opinion at the core of its agenda, there has been insufficient
attention paid to the theoretical issues concerning constitutional inter-
pretation. Paradoxical though this may sound, it is a function of what
might be termed the reactive nature of most scholarship to what the
courts do. Scholars tend only to go one step beyond what the courts
do. For example, to the extent that a court offers reasons for judgment
that are formalistic in tone, critics will respond by signalling the call
for a more realist or consequence-oriented approach. To the extent that
courts invoke, implicitly or explicitly, a particular image of Canadian
federalism in justification of their decision, commentators tend to do
little more than argue for or against that image. There is a lack of a
critical distance from the terms of the debate, an insufficient attention
to the problem of interpretation as a problem. Indeed, just as the critics
of the Privy Council failed to provide a consistent or coherent picture
of constitutional interpretation,8 contemporary scholars pay insufficient
75 Section 24(2).
76 For a sympathetic, though not uncritical discussion of the use of opinion polls in this context,
see D. Gibson, "Determining Disrepute: Opinion Polls and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1983) 61 Can. B. Rev. 377. In The Queen v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, Le Dan
J. rejects the use of opinion polls in applying section 24(2). Nevertheless, measuring the public's
perceptions would still be important for those interested in gauging the impact of the Charter
on public attitudes.
77 American studies generally suggest that the impact of the exclusionary rule has been less
dramatic than public perceptions would suggest. See, for example, B.C. Canon, "Ideology and Reality
in the Debate over the Exclusionary Rule: A Conservative Argument for its Retention" (1982)
23 S. Tex. Li. 559.
78 Cairns, supra note 20.
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attention to the foundations of their arguments about interpretation. There
is a rich literature being produced in the United States on the subject
of interpretation and Canadian academics could profit by immersing
themselves in it and adapting it to the Canadian context.79
In this regard, there is considerable promise in the application of
rhetorical theory to constitutional law8o On issues of interpretation, a
rhetorical perspective would reveal the futility of any attempt to reduce
constitutional interpretation to a single method or approach. Instead, a
rhetorical perspective both reveals and justifies a variety of competing
conventions and functions of interpretation, all of which legitimately can
be invoked in constitutional cases81 Moreover, by insisting on the non-
conclusive nature of argumentation generally, rhetorical theory offers
the possibility of rescuing the debate about the integrity of judicial
interpretation from the sterility of the "law versus politics" dichotomy
into which it too often falls.82
Rhetorical theory is also useful in understanding the nature of the
judicial opinion. Generations of legal realism notwithstanding, there is
a tendancy amongst many writers to take the judicial opinion at face
value as if it necessarily reflected the reasoning process of the courts.
Were the rhetorical nature of reasons for judgment better appreciated,
scholars would have a sounder basis for better understanding how courts
invoke various forms of constitutional argument in an effort, in part,
to legitimate their decisions as appropriate in the circumstances.83 This,
in turn, would provide valuable information to a variety of audiences,
notably the bar, whose function is largely rhetorical, and to the academic
community interested in the behaviour of governmental institutions like
the courts. More generally, viewing constitutional law as a rhetorical
process can serve as an organizing paradigm within which inter-
disciplinary research on constitutional law could be undertaken. Inasmuch
as the analysis of rhetoric is concerned primarily with how argumentation
does or does not persuade, rhetorical analysis demands both an internal
and external perspective on its subject. An internal perspective is necessary
79 Helpful introductions to this literature may be found in (1982) 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 ff.
and in (1985) 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1-725.
110 On modem theories of rhetoric, see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra note 7; K. Burke,
A Rhetoric of Motives (1950); M.A. Nathanson & H.W. Johnstone, eds., Philosophy, Rhetoric; and
Argumentation (1965); L.F. Bitzer & E. Black, eds., The Prospect of Rhetoric (1971); T.R. Nilsen,
ed., Essays on Rhetorical Criticism (1968).
81 See P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate" Theory of the Constitution (1982).
82 M. Gold, "The Rhetoric of Constitutional Argumentation" (1985) 35 U. Toronto LJ. 154.
83 M. Gold, "The Mask of Objectivity: Politics and Rhetoric in the Supreme Court of Canada"
(1985) 7 Supreme Court L.R. 455.
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because the rhetorical conventions that make up constitutional argument
are the tools with which decisions are reached and justified, while an
external perspective is necessary to understand the values and expectations
of the audiences to which constitutional argument is directed.84
In summary, scholarship of a traditional kind is an important and
necessary part of a proper understanding of the Constitution, but it must
be complemented by work that draws upon the perspectives of disciplines
other than law. Although there are some examples of inter-disciplinary
work being done on constitutional issues, it hardly represents the main-
stream of constitutional scholarship. It only remains to conclude with
some general thoughts about how we might facilitate the production
of more work of this kind.
I. CONCLUSION
One can be forgiven for reacting in a bemused way to a call for
more work of an inter-disciplinary kind, for despite such prescriptions
having been made in the past, relatively little work of this kind has
been done. One problem continues to be that lawyers talk a different
language from those engaged in other disciplines. We lawyers may tell
ourselves that we are receptive to the insights possibly available from
other disciplines, but our training and orientation constitute a certain
bridge over which much dialogue simply founders. Moreover, from an
institutional point of view, attempts to bring the perspective of other
disciplines to the study of law typically begin and end by appointing
one or two non-lawyers to law faculties, if that at all. This marginalizes
the contribution that such scholars might make. I overstate the case
unfairly, no doubt, but the fact remains that the promise of a new inter-
disciplinary scholarship remains more a matter of aspiration than of
realization.
Nevertheless, in certain ways, we are better situated now to pursue
inter-disciplinary work than were previous generations of academic
lawyers. This is a function of the assimilation into main-stream legal
thinking of some of the central claims of the realist movement: few
serious scholars would dispute the propositions that law is not a field
completely autonomous from other disciplines, that judges make choices
even as they appear to be following the ostensible imperatives of text
or doctrine, and that the nature of these choices is, in principle, subject
to evaluation from perspectives beyond the law itself.
" Ibid.
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This having been said, it remains the case that this work will not
flourish unless some evaluation takes place within the institutional
structures in which scholarship is produced. In the long run, the key
may be to develop what Law and Learning calls a scholarly stream within
legal education, although the risk is that, in an enthusiasm to embrace
the putative insights from other disciplines, one might ignore the distinctive
contribution that traditional forms of scholarship might make.s5 In the
short run, we should build upon some of the networks that are currently
emerging between law and other disciplines. For example, the Canadian
section of the International Asso6iation for Philosophy of Law and Social
Philosophy brings lawyers and philosophers together on an annual basis
to exchange papers on topics of mutual interest, most recently that of
equality rights. As well, the Canadian Law and Society Association has
recently been created, with the same potential for fruitful exchange.86
In my view, we should go one step further to institutionalize such
inter-disciplinary contact in a more durable way. We require more and
better-funded research centres wherein interested scholars can work
together for a protracted period of time, and where lawyers and non-
lawyers can educate themselves in the methodologies and perspectives
of each others' disciplines.7 Lawyers interested in pursuing inter-
disciplinary work must guard against the assumption that there is some
"magic key" to be found in some other discipline that will provide the
hard answers to difficult issues. This is especially important when the
other discipline tends to make rather overblown claims for itself, as is
the case with too much work in law and economics.s8 Non-lawyers
interested in legal matters must educate themselves in the methods and
assumptions of traditional legal scholarship in order to better understand
the significance of constitutional law to the constitutional lawyers
themselves. No account of any social phenomenon is adequate without
a sensitivity to the meaning of that phenomenon for those actively engaged
in it.89
The generation of more and better inter-disciplinary work is the
challenge that faces constitutional scholars at the present time. One cannot
85 For some thoughts on the unique contribution that the legal perspective can offer, see C.
Fried, "The Artificial Reason of the Law or What Lawyers Know" (1981) 60 Tex. L. Rev. 35.
86 The creation of the Canadian Law and Society Association coincides with the launching
of the Canadian Journal of Law and Society, thereby providing a specific place where inter-disciplinary
work on Canadian topics can be published.
87 See Law and Learning, supra, note 1 at 126-27.
88 See, generally, G. Hughes, "The Great American Legal Scholarship Bazaar" (1983) 33
I Leg. Ed. 424.
89 See W. Runciman, ed., Max Weber Selections in translation (1978) at 7-25.
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and should-not force inter-disciplinary work on those unwilling to do
it, but we can facilitate it to a greater degree than we have. I am optimistic
that, with some institutional changes along the lines of the research centre
model, constitutional scholars can and will respond to the challenge.
